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Note: Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia: A Demarcation of Access
Several months after this symposium, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, holding that the Constitution implicitly guarantees the
right of the public to attend a criminal trial, which a court
must keep open to the public, absent an express finding of an
overriding interest. This note explores the numerous opinions
in Richmond Newspapers to determine whether that case has
expanded access rights since the recent decision in Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale. The author reconciles the two decisions and
concludes that the issues raised in the symposium remain vital.
John Paul Stevenson was indicted by the State of Virginia in
March 1976 for the murder of a hotel manager.1 He was promptly
tried and convicted of second degree murder in July. A year later,
the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed this initial conviction,' and
a second' and a third4 trial in the same court resulted in mistrials.
Before the fourth trial began, two reporters for Richmond News-
papers, Inc., were among observers in'the courtroom when the de-
fense attorney moved to close the trial to the public.5 The judge
granted the closure motion, stating that "the statute gives me that
power specifically and the defendant has made the motion."'
1. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1977). The victim
died from multiple stab wounds; the defendant was indicted after the police obtained the
bloodstained shirt he wore on the day of the murder. The blood type of the stains matched
that of the deceased. Id.
2. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction because the trial court
improperly admitted into evidence the bloodstained shirt, which police had acquired from
the defendant's wife.
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2818 (1980). The mistrial
resulted when the court granted a juror's request to be excused and no alternate juror was
available. Id.
4. The second mistrial resulted when a prospective juror who had read about the pre-
vious trials related the inadmissible information about the bloodstained shirt to other pros-
pective jurors before the third trial began. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
5. Defense counsel moved for closure because he did not "want any information being
shuffled back and forth [in a] recess as to . . .who testified to what." Id. at 2819. The
prosecutor stated that he had no objection to the motion; the two reporters employed by
Richmond Newspapers failed to object at the time of the motion. Id.
6. Id. at 2819 (quoting Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Close Trial to the Public at 2-3, Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Transcript)). The trial court referred to VA. CODE § 19.2-266
(1950), which provides in part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor
cases, the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose
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Later that day the newspaper requested that the judge vacate
the closure order.7 After hearing oral argument, the judge denied
the request to vacate and ordered the trial to continue "with the
press and public excluded." The trial continued and the defen-
dant was acquitted,9 but two weeks later the court granted the
newspaper's motion to intervene nunc pro tunc.10 The newspaper
then unsuccessfully petitioned for writs of mandamus and prohibi-
tion to the Supreme Court of Virginia," which also denied its peti-
tion for appeal from the closure order.12 On certiorari,13 the Su-
preme Court of the United States held, reversed: The right of the
public and the press to attend criminal trials is constitutionally
mandated, "[a]bsent an overriding interest"1 4 articulated in the
findings of the trial court. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has recently displayed a growing sensitiv-
ity toward the right of the accused to obtain a fair trial and toward
the conflict of this right with the traditional rights of the media
and the public to have access to and report judicial proceedings. 5
The clash between the rights of defendants to fair trials and the
rights of a free press has become more visible as a result of in-
creased technological capabilities and growing access demands by
the media. In 1966, the case of Sheppard v. Maxwells exemplified
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the
accused to a public trial shall not be violated.
7. 100 S. Ct. at 2819. A hearing was set for the close of the first day of trial. The judge
ruled that the hearing was part of the trial and cleared the courtroom.
8. Id. at 2820 (quoting Transcript, supra note 6, at 12).
9. Id. A court order issued on the second and final day of the trial disclosed that after
the jury had been excused, the judge granted the defendant's motion to strike testimony
concerning the bloodstained shirt and found the defendant not guilty. The court made tapes
of the trial available to the public upon completion of the trial. Id. at 2820 n.3.
10. Id. at 2820.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The petitioner also sought appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976). The
Court denied this request, as the newspaper did not challenge the validity of the Virginia
statute promptly or explicitly in the state courts. 100 S. Ct. at 2820 n.4.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
15. E.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383-84 (1979); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 549 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959).
16. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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an abuse of such press access. In Sheppard, the Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard for the murder of his
wife because the trial judge did nothing to limit the effects of in-
tense prejudicial publicity surrounding the trial. 17 According to
Justice Clark, writing for the Court, "bedlam reigned at the court-
house during the trial and newsmen took over practically the en-
tire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, es-
pecially Sheppard." 18
The Sheppard decision was significant because it focused on
the importance of judicial control over the courtroom setting. The
Court held that the trial judge has the power to control the press
and that "the cure lies in those remedial measures that will pre-
vent the prejudice at its inception." 19 Justice Clark enumerated
possible preventive measures, including continuance, change of
venue, sequestration of the jury, and proscription of any extrajudi-
cial statements that divulged prejudicial matters.2 0 The most effec-
tive of these proposed measures is judicial control over courtroom
access by the press to eliminate the source of potentially prejudi-
cial information.'
The Sheppard decision created a judicial obligation to control
sensational media coverage to protect the fair trial rights of the
accused. This obligation spawned a multitude of responses,"2 in-
17. The trial judge took no action to stop pretrial publicity because he believed he
lacked the necessary power. Id. at 357-58. That belief was not unreasonable, in view of the
lack of relevant precedent in 1954, at the time of the trial. Not until 1961 did the Supreme
Court reverse as unconstitutional a state conviction because of jurors' exposure to prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity, in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310 (1959), the Court reversed a federal conviction where the jurors'had read news
accounts of information "of a character. . . so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as
evidence." Id. at 312. The Court based the Marshall reversal on its supervisory power to
apply proper standards for enforcement of the criminal law in the federal courts. Id. at 313
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)).
18. 384 U.S. at 355.
19. Id. at 363.
20. Id. at 361. The Court occasionally has reiterated these options as viable alterna-
tives to protect the fair trial rights of the accused without denying the media an opportunity
to report on the proceedings. See, e.g., 100 S. Ct. at 2840 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. 384 U.S. at 358. See Portman, The Defense of Fair Trial from Sheppard to Ne-
braska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Affirmative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 393, 406 (1977).
22. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969). Members of the judiciary developed this
report to implement the Sheppard v. Maxwell decision. It was amended in 1971. See Sup-
plemental Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 51 F.R.D. 135 (1971). In response to the Gannett and Richmond
decisions, the Committee has recently issued a revised report. See note 117 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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cluding the use of prior restraining orders to prevent the press
from reporting prejudicial information it obtained. 3 Judges widely
used these "gag orders"2 4 until the Supreme Court substantially
curtailed their use, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.2
The Court in Nebraska Press unanimously held that a re-
straining order that prevented the press from releasing information
obtained at a pretrial hearing was an improper restraint on publi-
cation.2 It adopted a test establishing a high threshold of justifica-
tion for the imposition of prior restraining orders.2 7 Although the
Court did not absolutely bar the use of gag orders, the language in
the opinion is prohibitive, and the Court is unlikely to sustain such
an order in the future.' Some commentators viewed the case as a
first step toward eliminating the permissible use of other types of
press restraints.2 But the decision did not otherwise restrict the
ways judges could indirectly limit the dissemination of informa-
tion, such as by closing hearings.3 0
23. Trial judges have relied upon Justice Clark's recommendation that they control
statements outside the courtroom as authority for the issuance of "gag orders" to trial par-
ticipants. 384 U.S. at 360-62" see Portman, supra note 21.
24. From 1967 to 1975, trial judges issued 39 gag orders, including 13 in 1974 and 14 in
1975. Landau & Roney, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A.J. 55,
57 (1976).
25. 427 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1976).
26. Id. at 570.
27. The test, which allows for the "gravity of the evil" of prejudicial publicity, to be
"discounted by its improbability" of harming the accused's right to a fair trial, id. at 562, is
based on Judge. Learned Hand's well-known formulation in United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), af/'d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). This standard was still not high
enough for Justice Powell, who filed a concurring opinion offering an even higher standard
for the issuance of prior restraints. 427 U.S. at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring); see Barnett,
The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. Rev. 539, 540-42 (1977).
28. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971).
29. E.g., Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 485, 495 (1977); Shellow, The Voice of the Grass: Erwin Charles Simmants' Efforts to
Secure a Fair Trial, 29 STAN. L. REv. 477, 484 (1977).
30. The Court stated: "Closing of pretrial proceedings with the consent of the defen-
dant when required is also recommended in guidelines that have emerged from various stud-
ies." 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also implied that closure
orders were not foreclosed: "Both petitioners and the State of Nebraska agree that the ques-
tion whether preliminary hearings may be closed to the public consistently with the 'Public
Trial' Clause of the Sixth Amendment is not before us, and it is therefore one on which I
would express no views." Id. at 576 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
By directly controlling the source of prejudicial publicity, the trial court indirectly but
effectively prevented the press from disseminating such information. See Schmidt, Ne-
braska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN.




One indirect method of controlling prejudicial information,
which simultaneously inhibits the press, is controlling access to the
source of information. The Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale1 held that a trial judge may limit the public's and the
press's access to a pretrial suppression hearing. The extent to
which this limitation applied to other judicial proceedings has been
a source of confusion and consternation to commentators8 and
judges s alike, in part because the 5-4 decision yielded opinions by
five of the Justices."
Gannett arose from a pretrial suppression hearing in a murder
case.35 At the outset of the hearing, the defense moved for closure,
the prosecution did not object, and the judge granted the motion.8
The Gannett Company, which had a reporter at the hearing who
had not objected and who left the courtroom when so ordered, un-
successfully appealed the closure order. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
87
The Court in Gannett held that the public and the press have
no constitutional right of access to a pretrial proceeding if the par-
ties agree it should be closed to protect the fair trial rights of the
defendant.33 A majority agreed that the sixth amendment right to
a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant, not the public."
31. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
32. E.g., Lewis, Keynote Address: The Right to Scrutinize Government: Toward a
First Amendment Theory of Accountability, 34 U. MAMI L. REv. 793 (1980); Younger, In
Search of Premises, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 807 (1980); see 100 S. Ct. at 2841 n.1.
33. See Younger, supra note 32, at 810. Professor Younger reviews some of the more
unusual judicial responses to Gannett.
34. 443 U.S. 368 (1979). The justices writing in the Gannett decision were: Stewart, J.,
majority, id. at 370; Burger, C.J., concurring, id. at 394; Powell, J., concurring, id. at 397;
Rehnquist, J., concurring, id. at 403; Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part, id. at 406.
35. The closure order issued by the trial judge in Richmond took place 10 months
before the Gannett decision. As one commentator put it, however, "a majority of the Burger
Court had long since made its antipathy toward the press a matter of notoriety." Zion, How
the Court Parried the Gannett Decision, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 4, 1980, at 15.
36. 443 U.S. at 375.
37. On the first appeal, the New York Appellate Division vacated the closure order for
failure to show extraordinary circumstances justifying such an order. Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976). On the second appeal, the New York Court
of Appeals reinstated the judge's order, noting that "criminial trials are presumptively open
to the public, including the press" but not at the expense of the accused. Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 373, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (1977), cert.
granted, 435 U.S. 1005 (1978).
38. 443 U.S. at 394.
39. Id. at 381.
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Much of the confusion among lower courts after Gannett devel-
oped from an interpretation of the majority opinion as applying to
the trial proper. Although closure of a pretrial hearing was at issue,
the majority opinion continually used the word "trial" when dis-
cussing the power of a judge to issue a closure order. 40 This failure
to distinguish adequately between the pretrial and the trial stage
of a judicial proceeding caused over 130 courts to close some part
of a proceeding, with at least thirty-five courts closing actual trials
to the press and the public.41 Some trial judges went so far as to
close trials to the press but not to the public.
42
THE SHIFT IN THE COURT
Faced with confusion from all sectors, the Court granted certi-
orari4S in the Richmond case in an attempt to clarify some of the
areas left in doubt after Gannett. The Richmond decision garnered
seven opinions, the greatest number of the Term." A majority
agreed that the public and the press presumptively have access to
criminal trials under the first amendment. Yet an analysis of the
individual opinions in Richmond shows that although the decision
prohibits the closing of trials when the judge states no adequate
reason therefor, it offers no general guidance about what circum-
stances would justify a closed trial.45
In a plurality opinion,41 Chief Justice Burger found a guaran-
40. Justice Stewart's majority opinion referred 12 times to the closing of a trial. Chief
Justice Burger, in his concurrence, distinguished the pretrial hearing in Gannett from an
actual trial but went on to join the majority opinion without limiting his concurrence only to
the judgment. In his Richmond concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted that Gannett could
have been explicitly limited to the pretrial setting had the Chief Justice not joined the
majority opinion. 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
41. NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1980, at 24. One commentator has offered a reason for the
obvious oversights in the Stewart opinion: that the opinion was originally intended to be a
dissent and as such was not drafted with the care and precision of a majority opinion in-
tended to become the law of the land. This dissent, with a few hasty changes, then became a
5-4 majority when Justice Powell switched sides at "the 11th-hour." Zion, supra note 35.
42. Younger, supra note 32, at 810.
43. 444 U.S. 896 (1979).
44. NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1980, at 24.
45. Justice Brennan sugested that a trial may be closed to keep national security in-
formation secret. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. For a recent discussion of the precedential value of plurality decisions, see Note,
The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 756
(1980). The problem created by a plurality opinion such as Richmond is the increased dis-
cretion it provides lower courts. Since a plurality opinion is unable to command a majority,
it usually is accompanied by a number of concurrences explaining the differences in posi-
tion; these additional opinions give a lower court judge relying on the case different options
within a supposedly binding decision.
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teed right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials, un-
less closure would serve an overriding interest set forth in the find-
ings of the trial judge." The Chief Justice relied on the first
amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment to create an express guarantee of communication "on
matters relating to the functioning of government."48 In support of
his interpretation of the first amendment, Chief Justice Burger de-
veloped a lengthy historical analysis of the origins of the criminal
trial and its traditional openness in the Anglo-American system.4
The Chief Justice distinguished Gannett by reiterating the point
of his Gannett concurrence that "a hearing on a motion before
trial to suppress evidence is not a trial . . . . "s0 Although he held
that there is a strong presumption that trials should be open, the
Chief Justice specifically declined to define those circumstances
that would permit closure of a criminal trial to the press and
public."1
Justices White and Stevens joined the Chief Justice's opinion,
but also wrote separately. Justice White chided the Court for re-
jecting the theory that the sixth amendment guarantees public ac-
cess to judicial proceedings, as argued by the dissent in Gannett,
and called the present case "unnecessary."52 Justice Stevens called
the decision "a watershed case." 3 He applied the first amendment
expansively, interpreting the decision as holding that "an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridge-
ment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the
First Amendment."" Unlike Justice White, Justice Stevens found
47. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
48. Id. at 2827.
49. Id. at 2821-26.
50. Id. at 2821 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 394 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring)) (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 2830 n.18. Although requiring an "overriding interest" to close trials, the
Chief Justice partially retreated in the same footnote, stating that a trial judge may impose
reasonable limitations on access to a trial. Again, he did not delineate what would constitute
reasonable circumstances. Id. The failure to offer suggestions leaves room for interpretation,
as did the decision in Nebraska Press. Compare id. with note 30 and accompanying text
supra.
52. Id. at 2830. (White, J., concurring).
53. Id. The media seized upon this phrase to celebrate their satisfaction with the deci-
sion. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, § A at 1; NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1980, at 24.
54. 100 S. Ct. at 2831. With this broad interpretation, Justice Stevens attempted to
extend the case to governmental access situations similar to those in Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (no right of access to a prison). See Note, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 680
(1978). Justice Stevens found it ironic that the Richmond decision extended protection to
such a strong segment of society, the press, whereas the Houchins decision "involved the
19801
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Richmond consistent with Gannett. The absence of any articulated
reason for closure, he argued, coupled with the "perfectly unam-
biguous"' 5 Gannett holding that sixth amendment rights inure to
the accused and not the public, adequately distinguished the two
cases.'
6
Justice Brennan's concurrence attempted to tie together the
freedom-of-access cases of the past decade.57 He placed the con-
cept of freedom of access to governmental information along a
continuum, arguing that the greater the governmental interest in
security or confidentiality, the greater the degree of restraint nec-
essary." Justice Brennan stated that "the First Amendment has
not been viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an
equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access
to information . . . ."59 He viewed criminal trials as falling in an
area on the continuum in which there was little justification for
restricted access. 0 He supported his argument with a lengthy his-
torical analysis similar in scope to that of the Chief Justice. Justice
Brennan accounted for Gannett by arguing that although Gannett
had held that the sixth amendment right to a public trial inures
only to the accused,61 it had not foreclosed a public right of access
grounded in another provision of the Constitution. He thus
viewed the first amendment as independently establishing a public
right of access to trial.'
Justice Stewart, the author of the Gannett opinion, uncon-
vincingly argued in his Richmond concurrence that Gannett had
explicitly left open the question whether other provisions of the
plight of a segment of society least able to protect itself," prison inmates. 100 S. Ct. at 2831
(Stevens, J., concurring).
55. 100 S. Ct. at 2831 n.2. But see id. at 2841 & nn.1 & 2 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 2831 n.2.
57. Id. at 2832-39 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
58. "[O]ur decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that any privilege
of access to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the
nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality." 100 S.
Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2832.
60. Id. at 2839.
61. Id. at 2832.
62. Id. at 2832-33.
63. Justice Brennan analogized the independent derivation of public trial rights to the
area of racial segregation, a practice the Court has found independently offensive to both
the equal protection clause and the fifth amendment due process clause. Id. at 2832 n.1.
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Constitution guaranteed a right of access to the courtroom." His
analysis of the first amendment distinguished prior cases, review-
ing the traditional amount of first amendment activity taking place
in the area to which access is sought. Justice Stewart applied a
continuum analysis similar to that of Justice Brennan, finding a
military base, prison, and jail inherently less public and thus less
accessible than a courtroom.1
Justice Blackmun, in a sharp concurring opinion directed at
the plurality opinion, welcomed the Court's historical analysis of
the public nature of the criminal trial. He confidently noted that
the present opinion recounted, unnecessarily, the legal history that
he had taken "great pains in assembling" in his Gannett dissent."
Although still believing that the Gannett majority had incorrectly
interpreted the sixth amendment,67 Justice Blackmun reluctantly
accepted the plurality's analysis of the first amendment as an
alternative means of providing some protection for the public to
attend trials. 8
Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, reiterated his Gannett position
64. Id. at 2839-41 (Stewart, J, concurring). But see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979). Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Gannett, stated that any first
amendment right "to attend. . . criminal trial[s] was not violated." Id. at 393. Significantly,
Justice Stewart found that the actions of the trial judge "were consistent with any right of
access the [newspaper] may have had under the First and Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
392. His opinion also identified the factors that would have weighed in favor of the press but
found them absent in that case. He argued in Gannett that the sixth amendment right of
the accused to a fair trial outweighed any first amendment rights attaching to the press or
public. Id. at 390-91. The opinion concluded that the Constitution provided the press no
affirmative right of access. This analysis hardly comports with his Richmond concurrence in
which Justice Stewart found the first amendment question to have been specifically left
open in Gannett. 100 S. Ct. at 2839-42 (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. In conspicuous contrast to a military base, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96
S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505; a jail, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242,
17 L.Ed.2d 149; or a prison, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41
L.Ed.2d 495, a trial courtroom is a public place. Even more than city streets,
sidewalks, and parks as areas of traditional First Amendment activity, e.g.,
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162, a trial
courtroom is a place where representatives of the press and of the public are not
only free to be, but where their presence serves to assure the integrity of what
goes on.
100 S. Ct. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
67. "It is gratifying ... to see the Court wash away at least some of the graffiti that
marred the prevailing opinions in Gannett." Id.
68. Id. at 2842. Justice Blackmun specifically declined to review the majority's errors
in the Gannett decision other than to refer vaguely to the present case as representing the
"utter fallacy of thinking" that the litigants in an adversarial system adequately protect the
public interest. Id. at 2842 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stewart had offered this
argument, in Gannett. 443 U.S. at 384.
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that the Constitution provides no right of review when the litigants
have agreed upon a closure order by the judge. The dissent pointed
to principles of federalism and warned against the Court's increas-
ing willingness to exercise decisionmaking power over the adminis-
tration of justice in each of the fifty states.6 9
COMMENT ON Richmond
The plethora of opinions in Richmond reflects the division
within the Court on the right-of-access issue. The failure of any
opinion to gain a majority permits the distillation of only the nar-
rowest of holdings. Although the decision did not absolutely forbid
the closing of a trial, common to all opinions on the prevailing side
is a test to overcome the first amendment privilege so forbidding
that the use of a closure order may no longer be available to pro-
tect the right of the accused to a fair trial. Chief Justice Burger
found an inherent presumption in our system of justice that trials
be public.70 This presumption is grounded on the unwavering
English and American tradition recognizing, throughout history,
that the administration of law in a free society requires open
trials.7
According to the plurality opinion, judges may close trials only
when there is an "overriding interest" for closure. Although he did
not specify what interests might qualify, the Chief Justice did enu-
merate alternatives to closure that satisfied "the constitutional de-
mands of fairness."' These alternatives are similar to those pro-
69. Id. at 2843. This federalism argument comports with Justice Rehnquist's philoso-
phy of limiting adversary proceedings in certain social conflicts. "[T]here are many valuable
institutions in any society which, although ultimately subject to the rule of law, cannot be
freely subjected to the adversary judicial process without significant damage to those insti-
tutions." Rehnquist, We are Family, Lawyers Stay Away, Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1980, at 15,
16. See also Rehnquist, The Adversary Society: Keynote Address of the Third Annual
Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 (1978).
70. 100 S. Ct. at 2821. "[V]alid interpreting of the Constitution ... must rest not only
on a reading of the words of the texts in question but also upon whatever historical evidence
relevant to those words discloses their essential meaning." Meiklejohn, The Balancing of
Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 4, 13 (1961).
71, 100 S. Ct. at 2821-25. Justice Brennan agreed. Id. at 2834-35 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
72. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
There was no suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have been
dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their sequestration during
the trial . . . .Nor is there anything to indicate that the sequestration of the
jurors would not have guarded against their being subjected to any improper
information. All of the alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial
courts, but none of the factors relied on here was beyond the realm of the
[Vol. 34:937
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posed in Nebraska Press,7  in which the Court disallowed prior
restraints as an available method of protecting a defendant's right
to a fair trial. The Chief Justice wrote the Nebraska Press major-
ity opinion as well as the plurality opinion in Richmond, and his
reasoning in each case focused on less drastic means available to
safeguard a defendant's right to a fair trial. Richmond thus implies
that the use of closure orders at trial is now limited to the same
extent as the use of prior restraining orders: their vitality has been
virtually extinguished. 4
An overbroad reading of Nebraska Press and Richmond sug-
gests that any judicial order that precludes the gathering and dis-
seminating of government information is presumptively unconsti-
tutional. Some in the media have cited Richmond to claim a
greatly expanded interpretation of a right of access. 5 The remain-
der of this casenote considers the precedential value of a decision
as fragmented as Richmond, and whether it meaningfully broadens
the scope of the public's right of access to information controlled
by government.76 A related consideration is whether Richmond im-
manageable.
Id.
73. 427 U.S. at 563-64.
74. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
Further, both Nebraska Press and Richmond relied heavily on the alternative measures
for judicial control of the courtroom suggested by Justice Clark in the Sheppard case:
[W]here there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, se-
questration of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte
with counsel.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 553 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63) (emphasis
in original).
[T]here exist in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to sat-
isfy the constitutional demands of fairness . . . . There was no suggestion that
any problems with witnesses could not have been dealt with by their exclusion
from the courtroom or their sequestration during trial.
Richmond, 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 357-62).
75. One commentator claims that the case recognizes a limitless application of the first
amendment in the right-of-access area. Goodale, Gannett is Burned by Richmond's First
Amendment 'Sunshine Act', Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 24; Goodale, The Three-Part
Open Door Test in Richmond Newspapers Case, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 22, 1980, at 26.
Given the continued disagreement between the members of the Court about the value
of the Gannett decision, such an evaluation is unsupportable. But because the press has
such a great interest in a broad application of Richmond, its own urging of that interpreta-
tion has little credibility.
76. The Richmond decision brought an immediate response from the Justice Depart-
ment, which proposed guidelines that specify when government attorneys should seek out or
acquiesce to a closure motion. Attorney General Civiletti stated the position of the Justice
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parts new logic in the debate over the meaning of the first amend-
Department: "These guidelines constitute an exercise of self restraint .... Even where the
law would premit closure, we will not approve unless it is clearly necessary to serve the ends
of justice." 6 MEDIA L. REP. (News Notes, No. 15). The proposed guidelines are as follows:
§ 50.9 POLICY WITH REGARD TO OPEN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Because of the vital public interest in open judicial proceedings, the Government
has a general affirmative duty to oppose their closure. There is, moreover, a
strong presumption against closing proceedings or portions thereof, and the De-
partment of Justice foresees very few cases in which closure would be warranted.
The Government should move for or consent to closed proceedings only when
closure is plainly essential to the interests of justice. In furtherance of the De-
partment's concern for the right of the public to attend judicial proceedings and
the Department's obligation to the fair administration of justice, the following
guidelines shall be adhered to by all attorneys for the United States.
(a) These guidelines apply to all federal trials, pre-trial evidentiary hearings,
plea proceedings, sentencing proceedings, or portions thereof, except as indi-
cated in (e) below.
(b) A Government attorney has a compelling duty to protect the societal
interest in open proceedings.
(c) A Govermnent attorney shall not move for or consent to closure of a
proceeding covered by these guidelines unless:
(1) no reasonable alternative exists for protecting the interests at stake;
(2) closure is clearly likely to prevent the harm sought to be avoided;
(3) the degree of closure is minimized to the greatest extent possible;
(4) the public is given adequate notice of the proposed closure, and the mo-
tion for closure is made on the record;
(5) transcripts of the closed proceedings will be unsealed as soon as the in-
terests requiring closure no longer obtain; and
(6) failure to close the proceedings will produce
(A) a substantial likelihood of denial of the right of a party to a fair trial,
(B) a substantial likelihood of imminent danger to the safety of parties, wit-
nesses, or other persons, or
(C) a substantial likelihood that ongoing investigations will be seriously
jeopardized.
(d) A Government attorney shall not move for or consent to the closure of:
(1) a civil proceeding except with the express authorization of the Associate
Attorney General, based on articulated findings which meet the requirements of
(c) above; or
(2) a criminal proceeding except with the express authorization of the Dep-
uty Attorney General, based on articulated findings which meet the require-
ments of (c) above
(e) These guidelines do not apply to:
(1) the closure of part of a judicial proceeding where necessary to protect
national security information or classified documents; or
(2) in camera inspection, or the receipt, consideration or sealing, during the
course of an open proceeding and as governed by substantive or procedural law
(including the rules of evidence), of the following: trade secrets or similar com-
mercial information, material which jeopardizes confidential investigative
sources and methods, or grand jury information; or
(3) conferences traditionally held at the bench or in chambers during the
course of an open proceeding.
6 MEDIA L. REP. (News Notes, No. 15) (Aug. 12, 1980).
A request for comments on the proposed standards yielded uniformly unfavorable criti-
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ment language: "or of the press.''17
AD Hoc BALANCING
Because Richmond produced seven different opinions, none of
which received more than three votes, any broad conclusions based
on the case are suspect. Despite the 7-1 decision to reverse, the
Justices were truly a Court divided. Each Justice followed an indi-
vidual route to his decision, and the majority failed to agree on all
but the narrowest holding.
Richmond is likely to be of little assistance to the many trial
judges still confused after Gannett. Such a composite of individual
balancing without regard for the concerns addressed by fellow Jus-
tices has been characterized as an individualized ad hoc balancing
test." A general ad hoc balancing causes a court to be
cast loose in a vast space, embracing the broadest possible range
of issues, to strike a general balance in the light of its own best
judgment .... [T]he test allow[s] a court to reach either con-
clusion in almost every case ....
The test cannot afford police, prosecutors, other govern-
ment officials and the individual adequate advance notice of the
rights essential to be protected. Moreover, the test is unwork-
able from the viewpoint of judicial administration, requiring for
ultimate decision an ad hoc resolution by the highest tribunal in
each case.79
Such confusion likely occurs when the Court uses an ad hoc
balancing of the same factors. But when each Justice uses different
factors, as in Richmond, the decisionmaking process is further
fragmented. Cases turn on the point at which each Justice balances
his own set of issues, with the resultant holdings being limited to
their facts. This situation manifests itself in Richmond, because six
Justices wrote opinions reversing the lower court, but each Justice
felt compelled to distinguish his balancing test.
In Richmond, Justice White refused to examine the applica-
cism. Many urged guidelines creating an affirmative duty for government attorneys to seek
open hearings whenever possible. Others worried that the proposed guidelines would create
increased secrecy in the federal courts. 6 MEDIA L. REP. (News Notes, No. 20) (Sept. 23,
1980).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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tion of the first amendment to the issue, although he accepted the
Chief Justice's conclusion."s Justice Stevens focused on the com-
plete absence of reasons proffered for closure.81 Justice Brennan
contrasted the first amendment rights of the public against the
sixth amendment rights of the defendants.82 Justice Stewart
examined the relative openness of various institutions.8 Chief
Justice Burger rested his decision on the differences between the
pretrial and the trial proceedings, and on history.84 Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent refused even to accept a role for the federal courts
in adjudicating such claims arising in state criminal justice sys-
tems.85 Such a diversity of factors used by each Justice within one
decision illustrates the individualized balancing used to arrive at a
composite decision.
A case decided under this methodology offers little value to
lower courts trying to decide future cases. Each distinct opinion in
a composite decision suggests the importance of a different set of
factors, allowing great leeway in the lower courts when applying a
Supreme Court decision. This diversity among the Justices may
occasionally grant refreshing insights, but prevents the Court from
fulfilling one of its primary obligations, that of providing interpre-
tive guidance on the laws of the land. Nonetheless, Richmond must
be examined to extract the principle on which one may fairly say a
majority of the Court has agreed.
ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT SOURCES
The all but absolute right of access to a trial found in Rich-
mond offers hope to the media that courts will read the decision to
require ever-expanding presumptions of access. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens stated, "for the first time, the Court un-
equivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to im-
portant information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech
and of the press protected by the First Amendment."" Previously
the Court had rejected right-to-access arguments in the context of
87a pretrial hearing, a prison," and a jail.89 The Court also declined
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (White, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2835 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2826 (Burger, C.J.).
85. Id. at 2844 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
87. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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to hear cases in which the courts below had denied access to a
death row execution"0 and a trial of a United States senator.9'
Thus, Richmond is a break from the Court's repeated decisions
denying access." Now that the Court has at least granted public
access in one "access" case, the relevant standard for access must
be identified. An examination of the opinions shows that if Rich-
mond means anything beyond the criminal trial context, it means
only that the public and the press presumptively have access to
government functions historically open to the public.
Examining Richmond in the context of the prior cases, one
might predict that a majority of the Court, consisting of the Gan-
nett dissenters" and a portion of the Gannett majority, 4 would
grant access only to those Court proceedings historically consid-
ered public, as in the case of the trial proper. Chief Justice Bur-
ger's analysis applied a historical limitation, as he distinguished
cases "concerned with. . . institutions [that] do not share the long
tradition of openness." 5 Justice Brennan's reasoning implicitly
embraced that standard: "the Constitution carries the gloss of his-
tory."" Justice Blackmun recognized the necessity for a historical
88. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
89. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). "Neither the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government's control." Id. at 15.
90. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
91. United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing denied, 562 F.2d
1257, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
The cases cited in notes 87-91 did not resolve whether the public has a right of access to
such information within the government's control. Since members of the press are at best
agents of the public in disseminating information that is subject to first amendment protec-
tion, "newsmen have no constitutional right of access. . . beyond that afforded the general
public." Pell, 414 U.S. at 834. Each of these cases has found that there was no right of
public access to the information sought. See generally Paul & Ovelman, Access Litigation, 6
LITIGATION 31 (1980).
92. Previously, repeatedly unsuccessful attempts at access litigation had led some
commentators to urge litigators either to sue in state court or reformulate the issues to avoid
the access question. See Paul & Ovelman, supra note 91.
93. They are Justices Blackmun, White, Brennan, and Marshall.
94. Within the Gannett majority, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Stewart have evinced an interest in accepting an historical analysis as grounds for qualifying
the first amendment right of access.
95. 100 S. Ct. at 2827 n.11.
96. 100 S. Ct. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall joined Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence. Justice Brennan's concurrence specifically noted two distinct principles
that required access. The first relied on history, because "a tradition of accessibility implies
the favorable judgment of experience." Id. The second would consider the nature of the
institution and the salutary effect public access would have on the functioning of the insti-
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limitation; he found "[t]he court's return to history. . . a welcome
change in direction.
9 7
Thus, most of the Justices are willing to recognize a first
amendment privilege of access restricted to areas historically open
to the public.' 8 The limitation of historical openness allows first
amendment access to areas that the public traditionally expects to
be accessible. Any such expectation, coupled with the new first
amendment right recognized in Richmond, may now provide rea-
sonable access to many areas previously untested in the courts.
Richmond, however, does not construe the first amendment as an
open-ended Freedom of Information Act request, because histori-
cal restraints will protect government from demands not within
traditional expectations.
As Justice Stewart advocated in his now famous remarks at
the Yale Law School:
The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception
in government. But the press cannot expect from the Constitu-
tion any guarantee that it will succeed. There is no constitu-
tional right to have access to particular government information,
or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public's inter-
est in knowing about its government is protected by the guar-
antee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Con-
stitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an
Official Secrets Act."
If each situation is reviewed in a proper historical context, in-
formation commonly kept secret from the public will remain se-
tution itself: "[Wihat is crucial ... is whether access to a particular government process is
important in terms of that very process." Id.
Brennan's second principle, while failing to command a majority of the Court, certainly
offers potential for increased access claims because it would allow courts to examine particu-
lar institutions and the effect of access on them, without having to meet the threshold re-
quirement of historical openness. For a further discussion of Justice Brennan's concurrence,
see Stotzky, Foreword: The First Amendment and the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 785
(1980). The Chief Justice also noted the salutary effect of open trials on the public percep-
tion of justice: "When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public
protest often follows .... Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important pro-
phylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion." 100
S. Ct. at 2824.
97. 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
98. The Court drew no distinction between the public and the press in its historical
analysis. Chief Justice Burger wrote, "most people receive information concerning trials
through the media whose representatives 'are entitled to the same rights [to attend trials] as
the general public.'" 100 S. Ct. at 2827 n.12 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965)).
99. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAsTINGs L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
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cret. 10 Therefore, given the limitations implicit in Richmond, the
case does not grant any newly defined areas of access to the public
under the first amendment other than the trial. New areas may or
may not become accessible, depending on a future determination
of their "historical" openness.
The press has begun to urge that Richmond represents a com-
plete reversal of the Court's repeated rebuff of past access claims
by the press in nontrial cases. 101 For example, a brief submitted in
support of releasing the tapes used in the "ABSCAM" bribery trial
of Representative Michael Myers argued that "the theory underly-
ing Richmond-based, as it is, on the benefits of open judicial pro-
ceedings. . . is far more consistent"102 with a decision that permits
access. The brief acknowledged that "the right of access [to the
tapes] is fortified by and its exercise informed by our constitution-
ally grounded tradition of openness of judicial proceedings-the
same right at issue in Richmond Newspapers itself."' 03
The holding in Richmond may well extend to the newly estab-
lished practice in some states of allowing television cameras in
courtrooms, to be decided by the Court in Chandler v. Florida.a4
Proponents of allowing "cameras in the courtroom" argue that
such coverage is compatible with the broad interests set forth in
Richmond. An amicus brief filed in Chandler by sixteen news
organizations argued that Richmond "creates at least a presump-
tion" in favor of newsgathering "that facilitates the widest and
most direct public review"10 5 of criminal trials. "The teaching of
100. In the context of prior restraints, the panel discussion in this symposium re-
viewed some of the areas of governmental information commonly concealed from the general
public. See Panel Discussion, 34 U. MIAMi L. REV. 891 (1980).
101. One such simplistic analysis concluded that Richmond reduced Gannett "to the
status of an awkward footnote in the Court's recent history." N.Y. Times, July 3, 1980, § A,
at 1, col. 2.
102. 6 MED. L. REP. (News Notes, No. 21) (Sept. 30, 1980). The videotapes, used as
evidence by the prosecution, showed Representative Myers apparently accepting money
from undercover F.B.I. agents who were posing as the representatives of a wealthy Middle
Eastern businessman. His accepting the money was the basis of the bribery charges. The
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the media had a right of
access to the tapes. See United States v. Myers, No. 1667 (decided Oct. 1, 1980), id. at 1961.
103. Id.
104. 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1832 (1980) (No.
79-1260). Over the defendant's objection, the trial court in Chandler permitted television
coverage of the trial under authority of FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Experimental Canon
3A(7). On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision and stated that the use of
cameras did not deny the defendant a fair trial, even though the jury had not been
sequestered.
105. 6 MED. L. REP. (News Notes, No. 22) (Oct. 7, 1980).
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Richmond about the strength of our society's commitment to open
and publicized trials necessarily means that certain minimal risks
will be accepted in order to vindicate the public's right to acquire
the most meaningful information."'' 0 6
Chandler is noteworthy because it represents an ideal instance
to test whether the press should be afforded even greater access
rights than the public under certain circumstances, as necessary
for the press to act as the public's informational "agent." Much of
the discussion in this symposium has considered whether the lan-
guage of the first amendment, "or of the press," gives the press
preferred constitutional protection beyond the free speech to
which everyone is entitled. Although the Court has stated that
"the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitu-
tional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally, 10 7 Chandler could be the occasion to change that
rule. A majority of the Justices have suggested that notwithstand-
ing the language of Branzburg and Pell, the press might indeed be
a special first amendment beneficiary. For example, it may be en-
titled to preferential seating, as a surrogate of the public, where
space is limited in a public forum. 08 Now that Richmond has held
that trials are public, "Iais a practical matter . . . the institutional
press is the likely, and fitting, chief beneficiary of a right of access
because it serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens, and funnels
information about trials to a large number of individuals."109
Depending on the outcome of Chandler, the press, until other-
wise instructed by the Supreme Court, will probably continue to
embrace the concept of expanded access to all areas of governmen-
tal information.1 That it will fully attain this goal, arguably nec-
106. Id.
107. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). That dictum was elevated to a
holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834-35 (1974).
108. In a footnote in Richmond, Chief Justice Burger noted: "[Slince courtrooms have
limited capacity, there may be occasions when not every person who wishes to attend can be
accommodated. In such situations, reasonable restrictions on general access are traditionally
imposed, including preferential seating for media representatives." 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18.
Justices Stevens and White joined that opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall, id. at 2832
n.2, and Justice Stewart, id. at 2840 n.3, expressed similar views. Justice Powell, dissenting
in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., argued that "[tihe press is the necessary representative of
the public's interest . . . and the instrumentality which effects the public's right." 417 U.S.
at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. 100 S. Ct. at 2832 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
110. The appellant's reply brief in the Chandler case chastizes the press for reading
too much into Richmond, beyond any plausible interpretation.
These self-appointed "surrogates", however, serve their own special inter-
ests. Who "appointed" the media to act for the public? The media! While a free
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essary to its "agency" function,"' is unlikely. First, its obvious
self-interest in enhanced access undermines its editorial credibility
in arguing for such access. Further, the facts of Richmond do not
support the inference that such access transcends the right to at-
tend trials. When Richmond is placed in the context of past
cases,"" it is evident that the Court did not intend to have Rich-
mond read as broadly as the institutional press suggests.
DoEs Gannett SURVIVE?
The historical balancing test will nevertheless allow future
Court decisions to grant access to areas not now considered within
the public domain but which may later be deemed so."'3 Will the
closure of a pretrial hearing, not specifically overruled in Rich-
mond, now withstand a first amendment challenge? Gannett's sur-
vival and its reach must be ascertained, to determine the validity
of over 130 judicial proceedings closed as a result of the Gannett
decision.
Gannett unequivocally remains intact despite Richmond. Al-
though the Court in Richmond displayed a convincing concern for
the public interest in a trial, there is no indication that this inter-
est in a public forum extends to pretrial proceedings. Further, the
closure of pretrial proceedings can withstand the test of historical
analysis. In the majority opinion of Gannett, Justice Stewart de-
tailed the history of both English and American law and concluded
that "the public had no right to attend pretrial proceedings.
''14
The Justices in the Gannett majority all drafted their Rich-
mond opinions with an eye toward preserving the Gannett holding.
press may be the backbone of our system of justice, the Defendant's right to a
fair trial is its life's blood. Presumably the press could accurately report on what
occurred on a particular day and in a particular courtroom without a single tele-
vision camera ever poking its tunnel-vision eye into the courtroom. But, how
does a wrongfully convicted defendant recover the loss of his freedom?
Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Chandler v. Florida, 366 So. 2d 64, prob. juris. noted, 100
S. Ct. 1832 (1980) (No. 79-1260).
111. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting);
see Lewis, supra note 32.
•112. See e.g., Gannett, 443 U.S. at 384-87; Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978)
(no right of access to a jail); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 863; Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,
616 (1960) (public excluded from a criminal contempt hearing).
113. As the right of the public to gather information expands statutorily, as it has
under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), the first amendment right of
access should also expand. Whether the Court will read greater statutory access to imply
even wider constitutional access remains to be seen.
114. 443 U.S. at 389.
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Chief Justice Burger noted that "the precise issue presented here
has not previously been before this Court for decision."'"" Justice
Brennan narrowed his Richmond opinion by reviewing the histori-
cal implications of trials only, so as not to infringe on the Gannett
holding on pretrials.11 6 The carefully worded opinions all make
clear distinctions between the two cases, seeking to limit the po-
tentially broad reach of the Richmond decision. It appears that the
Gannett majority still stands ready to uphold a pretrial closure
order agreed upon by all the participants, with the line of demar-
cation falling between the open trial and the closed pretrial
proceeding.
The United States Judicial Conference recently adopted this
view of the law post-Richmond. In a discussion of the recent devel-
opments since "Fair Trial-Free Press" guidelines for the federal
judiciary were adopted, the report noted that "It]he subsequent
decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia dealt with a
trial and did not disturb the holding in Gannett, as to closure of a
pretrial proceeding." 7 The report found the Richmond decision
"[i]mplicitly approving Gannett's ruling."118
CONCLUSION
The Richmond decision represents the Court's attempt to
mend the havoc it wrought in Gannett. The use of closure orders
in all types of judicial proceedings demonstrates the rampant con-
fusion throughout the judiciary. The Court in Richmond has at-
tempted to bring order to this area by finding trials presumptively
open, yet allowing pretrial proceedings to be closed at the will of
the parties, as in Gannett. This line of demarcation is an obvious
one advocated in the Richmond opinions.
The tension between the first and sixth amendments will con-
tinue as Richmond removes another judicial means of protecting
115. 100 S. Ct. at 2821.
116. Justice Brennan limited his opinion with particularity:
[Wihat is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government
process is important in terms of that very process.
To resolve the case before us, therefore, we must consult historical and cur-
rent practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of public
access to the trial process itself.
Id. at 2834.
117. Revised Report to the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 6 MED. L. REP. 1897, 1899 (Oct. 21,
1980).
118. Id.; see note 22 supra.
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the accused's right to a fair trial. The Richmond decision for the
first time recognizes a right of access to governmental information,
and establishes that communication rights must be honored at
least when no other constitutional concerns are articulated. So far,
however, the Court has limited this right of access to the trial, and
until further comment from the Court, Gannett is undisturbed.
Although all of the participants in the symposium expressed
their awareness of the Richmond case, the Court had not handed
down the decision at the time of the lecture. Thus, the articles
presented do not reflect the Court's decision to grant access to gov-
ernmental information. It is interesting to note that even before
Richmond, the speakers uniformly urged that some access be
granted. Their disagreement about the extent of this right of ac-
cess was as great as the diversity within the Court in the Rich-
mond decision. In reading the arguments presented by the speak-
ers, one should realize that the Richmond decision underscores
rather than dissipates many of the concerns raised by the sympo-
sium's participants.
DENNIS SCHOLL
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